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Abstract  
 Ghana commenced the oil and gas extraction in commercial 
quantities in the year 2011 and hence the country was listed among oil and 
gas producing countries in the sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, Ghanaians’ 
optimism widened because the oil and gas sectors were the change agent for 
social infrastructure and better living standards. Suddenly, however, 
Ghanaians’ optimism started to dwindle due to the lack of accountability 
mechanism to protect their interest.  This study explored the Ghanaians’ 
misgivings regarding the accountability mechanism in the oil and gas 
sectors. Primary data for this study was collected from interviews and 
survey.  Findings revealed that the majority of Ghanaians are pessimistic 
about the prospects of the oil and gas sectors for ensuring parity in national 
development. It concluded that Ghanaians have little information about the 
accountability mechanism to protect their interest and therefore 
recommended a policy action to strengthen the accountability and prevent 
the resource curse syndrome.  
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Introduction 
 Ghana emerged as a new oil and gas producing economy in 2011. 
Consequently, Ghana was listed among the oil-rich nations in sub-Saharan 
Africa when the country commenced the extraction of oil and gas products in 
commercial quantities in 2011(Adam, 2012). Commercialization of Ghana’s 
Jubilee Fields oil and gas extraction in 2011 led the government to initiate a 
consortium which consisted of researchers, policy-makers and media 
practitioners to address some of the perceived challenges in oil and gas 
extraction and petroleum producing industries such as the “resource curse” 
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syndrome (Mohammed, 2012).  History has shown that commercialization of 
oil and gas extraction often comes with delicate legal, technical, economic, 
financial and environmental challenges and that maximizing the benefits 
from Ghana’ Jubilee Fields’ oil and gas extraction requires a constant 
balancing act between resource and oil companies (Amaechi, 2010).  The 
risk of “resource curse” associated with the extractive industries is very 
critical and hence the redistribution of oil and gas resources should not be 
taken for granted (Brobbey, 2014).  
 
Statement of Research Problem  
 The majority of Ghanaians lack access to information about the 
quantity or volume of oil and gas usually extracted from the Jubilee Fields 
and the accountability mechanism for protecting the interest of the citizens 
against unfair redistribution of oil and gas benefits (Bissue, 2011). 
Consequently, Ghanaians are wondering whether or not the “black gold” 
would provide socio-economic infrastructures (economic growth, jobs, 
improved living standards) or become a resource curse (threat to national 
development) (Adam, 2012).  This study therefore argues that the revenues 
from Ghana’s Jubilee Fields could facilitate national growth and 
development if it is well managed.  
 Ghanaians received the news about the discovery of oil and gas in 
Ghana’s Jubilee Fields with great enthusiasm simply because most 
Ghanaians had anticipated a booming economy coupled with a fleet of jobs 
leading to better living standards. However, some months into the 
commencement of the oil and gas extraction, the euphoria with which 
Ghanaians welcomed the oil and gas discovery tidings through the varied 
media houses began to erode leaving many Ghanaians in the state of 
quandary and despair (Efam –Dovi, 2013).  
 There is a lack of an accountability mechanism at Ghana’s Jubilee 
Fields’ operations coalesced with pervasive patronage politics and hence 
revenues obtained have been misappropriated or mismanaged in favour of a 
few Ghanaians at the expense of the majority otherwise known as the 
‘resource course’(Adam, 2012).  For instance, the generally held views of 
many Ghanaians about lack of information reported by the varied media  
about the quantity of oil and gas produced and a lack of an accountability 
mechanism about the management of the revenues obtained from the 
industries have led many Ghanaians to become more agitated.  Indeed, 
Ghanaians are wondering whether or not the “black gold” would ensure 
parity with regards to national development or to benefit just a few 
Ghanaians (Efam –Dovi, 2013).  
 Some scholars have reiterated that the management of the Jubilee 
Fields’ revenues is characterized by patron-clientelist networks and that it is 
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preventing the hard fact regarding the total quantity of oil and gas and the 
revenues obtained from the extractive industries from coming into the  public 
domain (Hogan and Goldsworthy, 2010).  Other scholars such as Nakhle 
(2011) and Adam (2012) attribute the lack of accountability to the rapacious 
exploitation of the resources in the developing countries by Western 
capitalist companies.  They argue that conflict can be inevitable if a natural 
resource like that in Ghana is not well managed. They claim that the way the 
international economic system is organized often makes resource rich 
countries not to benefit significantly from their resources.  To Perkins 
(2005), clearly, under a capitalist regime, oil or gas or any natural resource is 
exploited by the multinational corporations.  From exploration to 
exploitation and transformation to marketing of the product requires huge 
capital investments undertaken by those companies.  To this end, the 
companies pay, but taxes to the state coffers and the state in turn is content 
because of job opportunities offered to the citizens.  For a developing 
country like Ghana, owning a natural resource does not automatically 
transform the citizens and the country into fabulous riches. This is because 
the operations of those companies (multinational corporations) are never 
transparent and are backed by their powerful states, which no African state 
has had the effrontery to challenge, at least for now.  
 It is important to note that many scholars have ascribed the lack of 
accountability in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil and gas extractive industries to 
widespread patron-clientelist networks (van de Walle, 2005).  To them 
patron- client network does not only endanger vertical accountability 
(inability of subordinates to question the Big man for bending the rules 
because perhaps the former have received some favour from the latter and 
unable to do so for fear of being fired). But also, it endangers horizontal 
accountability (political leaders often fail to hold their Ministers and Chief 
Executives accountable to their actions or inactions due essentially to kick-
backs). Indeed, these actions or inactions of the capitalists and political 
leaders often prevent the hard fact about the Jubilee Fields’ revenues from 
coming into the public domain (van de Walle, 2005). And hence little is 
known about the accountability mechanism about the revenues from the 
Jubilee Fields. 
 Thus, this study argues that the accountability challenges in the 
Jubilee’s oil and gas sector in Ghana are underlined by several practical 
questions such as: Would the international oil companies not take advantage 
of an inexperienced, emerging, oil-producing country such as Ghana in the 
petroleum contracts? Would Ghana’s fiscal regime and neopatrimonial 
tendencies not pose a serious challenge to the oil industries?  What is the 
efficacy and/or likely setbacks of the existing legal and regulatory 
framework? Are the institutions such as Parliaments, media and other 
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stakeholders making efforts to promote the rules and laws to sustain and to 
guide the emerging industry? How adequately, is the media informing and 
educating the public about this?  
 With regards to the questions above, this study broadly, explores the 
accountability challenges in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil and gas extraction 
sector. Specifically, it examines the extent to which the international oil 
companies could take advantage of an inexperienced, emerging, oil-
producing country such as Ghana in the petroleum contracts. It explores how 
Ghana’s fiscal regime coupled with neopatrimonial tendencies could pose a 
serious challenge to the oil industries. It analyzes the efficacy and/or the 
setbacks if any, of the existing legal and regulatory framework. Moreover, it 
examines the efforts made by institutions such as Parliament, media and 
other stakeholders in promoting the rules and the laws to sustain and to guide 
the emerging industry. Finally, to analyze how adequately the media is 
informing and educating the public on oil and gas extraction issues. 
 
Theoretical Framework/ Literature Review 
 Putting issues of accountability in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil and gas 
extraction sector in the proper perspective would not be complete without a 
careful consideration of views expressed and theories propounded on oil and 
gas exploration, exploitation, transformation and marketing. It would, also, 
be particularly useful to examine the legality involved in the management of 
the Jubilee Fields’ revenues, and the entire energy sector in Ghana and 
elsewhere. Beginnings of the oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the 
sub-Saharan Africa’s oil economy would also be explored.  
 This study thus, analyzes the main contributions from different 
articles. Natural resource endowment has value to which the owner has a 
claim. When the owner is not the resource developer or producer, fiscal 
instruments are used to capture that value (Mummer, 2011).  
 Against the background of over a century of mining; Ghanaians are 
understandably uncertain and anxious about whether the value of the natural 
endowed resources often allocated to Ghana is fair. A difficult question to 
answer.  Some scholars have asserted that Ghana’s petroleum fiscal regime 
as of the year 2010, compares the key features of the regime with that of a 
peer group of oil-producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and assesses 
the regime against five key features of importance to government and 
prospective investors: the degree of progressivity, stability, flexibility, 
neutrality and how the regime distributes the burden of risk between the 
resource owner and contractors (Amoako-Tuffuor and Owusu-Ayim, 2012). .  
 However, before proceeding to review the relevant studies on oil and 
gas exploration and exploitation, this study provides the theoretical 
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foundation upon which the understanding of how oil and gas economy 
facilitates national development or otherwise produces ‘resource curse.’ 
 Theories abound on natural resources exploration and exploitation. 
Perhaps it is because natural endowed resources are one social-economic 
empowerment that is critical in most societies worldwide According to 
Amoako-Tuffuor and Owusu-Ayim (2012), the most crucial of all human 
dependence finds expression in natural resources in this case oil and gas 
economy. Apart from ensuring economic development through redistribution 
of resources, it also attracts direct foreign investments as well as foreign 
earnings. 
 The discussion of whether or not the “black gold” would facilitate 
development and produce a resource curse is subsumed under two theoretical 
paradigms otherwise known as ‘Theories of natural resources exploration 
and exploitation propounded by Amoako-Tuffuor and Owusu-Ayim (2012).  
First is the ‘Theory of Oil-rich or Wealth Nations’ and second, is the ‘Theory 
of Resources Curse’ or the ‘Dutch Disease.’   
 The theory of ‘oil-rich or Wealth Nations’ states that countries with 
well-endowed oil and gas resources turn to develop at a faster pace but with 
high level of crimes.. The theory explains that oil and gas extractive 
industries usually have great opportunities to expand their economies 
through socio-economic infrastructural development such as job creation, 
provision of social amenities and better living standards. However, this often 
comes with a cost. When the resources are not properly handled this could 
lead to a high level of crimes and crime related phenomena. By extension, it 
means that any attempt by the state to misappropriate the revenues generated 
from the oil and gas extractive industries could lead to unfortunate 
circumstances such as disorders in the form of political instability, persistent 
pirating and  resource curses.  
 Indeed, this theory is useful for this study in two ways. First, at least, 
it places Ghana in the context of oil-rich nations which the study found to be 
correct. Second, it advances the argument made earlier that oil wealthy 
economies are often manipulated by the capitalist economy.  For example, 
under the capitalist regime, oil and gas or any natural resource is exploited 
by the multinational corporations from exploration to exploitation and from 
transformation to marketing of the product. The fact is that the exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources require huge capital investments and 
this is usually undertaken by those multilateral companies.  To this end, for a 
developing country like Ghana, owning a natural resource does not 
automatically transform the citizens and the country into fabulous riches as 
the resource wealth or oil-rich nation’s theory projects. Besides, the roles 
played by the multinational corporations also undermine accountability since 
those companies are themselves not transparent.     
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 In the meantime, on the surface, the theory sounds quite plausible, 
because rich oil nations, indeed, have the potency to become prosperous.  
Similarly, oil and gas revenues management has a legal backing, however, 
certainly those laws and regulations are often not sufficient to ensure 
accountability since those laws and regulations are often designed by the 
multinational corporations themselves. A major feature of the oil and gas 
industries is that its accountability mechanism is problematic and that could 
lead the future of oil and gas economy to a very critical situation or produce 
a resource curse.   It is rare to find any oil-rich nation in sub-Saharan Africa 
operating a transparent and accountable oil and gas economy due to 
pervasive patronage politics and crony capitalism (networks involving 
placing cronies at vantage positions for mutually reciprocating benefits).  
  This study finds this theory to be inconsistent with the reality of oil 
and gas extraction economy.  And therefore it argues that the theorist could 
have shown how oil- rich nations could also serve to benefit other economies 
and not seen as only facilitating doom.  Oil and gas revenues could promote 
national development if media access to information about the sector is not 
facile and stakeholders do not lack insight into the operations, and 
government and oil and gas partners desist from patronage politics and 
excessive capitalism. This leads the study to examine the theory of the 
resource curse. 
 However, another theory worthy our attention as far as this study is 
concerned is the ‘Resource Curse theory’ which states that  mismanagement 
of the revenues; and the crime associated with it  is the “visible form of the 
invisible curse”(Amoako-Tuffuor and Owusu-Ayim, 2012).  Evidence from 
media reportage attests to the position of this theory. Media reportage  
explains  that wars and other related crime activities have become pervasive 
in most oil-rich nations not because oil and gas themselves are evil resources 
but rather, the mishandling of such black gold is tantamount to high level of 
crime and some level of obscenity. 
 To a large extent, the theory employed in this study explains how a 
lack of an accountability mechanism in oil and gas sectors could engender 
mismanagement and hence undermines its perspective or realities. It also 
reinforces what the Dutch disease makes in countries where corruption is 
rampant. It is important to note that oil and gas extractive industries lack 
accountability mechanism. They are characterized by pervasive patron-
clientelist networks and crony capitalism. So, it sounds convincing to claim 
that the mismanagement of oil and gas revenues is predestined and 
conspicuous in all oil and gas rich nations. But, this study wonders how the 
theory would explain the nuanced re-distribution of national revenues among 
the advanced world? How have oil revenues issues in the advanced countries 
been explored? Is the advanced world also likely to suffer all the crime 
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related issues that are found in the ‘third world countries’? And if yes, how 
does the theory of resource curse explain this? 
 In view of this, this study hypothesizes that the revenues obtained 
from the oil and gas extractive industries would be a blessing or a curse 
depending upon the manner in which the revenues would be put to use. The 
majority of Ghanaians are pessimistic about whether or not the oil and gas 
sectors would focus on national development and not be a menace towards 
national security. 
 In what follows, the study reviews the relevant studies. This is a 
highly important research subject that has a potential for an innovative 
contribution in that there is a dearth of publications on Ghana’s emerging oil 
and gas economy- how it is structured, managed and efforts to avoid the 
resource curse syndrome that has ravaged many natural resource-rich 
African countries.  First, this study unravels the accountability challenges 
bedeviling Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil and gas sectors.  Second, it plugs the 
knowledge gap and hence expands the frontiers of knowledge regarding the 
literature on accountability challenges in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields’ oil and gas 
extraction.  
 Here, this study takes issues with a number of articles about the 
discourse on accountability of oil and gas revenues management.  This study 
begins with Adam’s (2012) assertion that it is a truism to say that good laws 
do not guarantee good application of laws. And this is exactly the case in 
Ghana’s application of the Petroleum Revenue Management Law (Act 815), 
which Tordo (2007) has claimed, variously, to be one of the best laws in the 
world.  Tordo (2007) contends that the law provides a strong and transparent 
mechanism for monitoring oil receipts and more importantly for spending the 
revenues accrued to the state. The author did not provide adequate 
explanation about who designed the laws of the state and who enforces it and 
whose interest it serves or who benefits most especially,  in a regime 
characterized by widespread patronage politics and  crony capitalism.  
 Similarly, this study takes issues with aspects of the Supplementary 
Budget which deals with oil revenues; and concludes that there is both 
misapplication of the law and insufficient explanation for certain decisions. 
For instance, in Section 110 of the Supplementary Budget, the Government 
justified the rationale behind the budget by stating that ‘developments in the 
domestic economy have necessitated the revisions made to the fiscal 
framework as follows: passage and implementation of the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act, 2011, Act 815, coupled with changes in world 
crude oil prices and revised oil production levels (Adam, 2012; Keen, and 
McPherson, 2011). However, in the case of petroleum revenues, this study 
contends that the government knew well the implications of such volatility 
but inadequately addressed them in the law.  
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 To  Adam (2012), what  the incumbent government ought to have 
done with the Supplementary Budget was to have revised mid-year the 
reference crude oil price to $100 per barrel  and production levels to 84,737 
barrels per day and by these new assumptions determined a higher 
Benchmark Revenue of  GH¢1,250.8m (70% of GHC1,250.8 m and 
GHC875.56 m).  However, this study also agrees to the assertion that  in the 
language of the law, any revenues in excess of the first Annual Budget 
Funding Amount (ABFA) are classified as excess revenues, and therefore do 
not form part of ABFA. The allocation of excess revenues as part of 
benchmark revenues and the ABFA is therefore an open violation of the Act 
815. Furthermore, the Supplementary Budget has created a second 
Benchmark Revenue and used it as the ‘foundation benchmark’, a practice 
inconsistent with the law. 
 The bone of contention in this study here is that, the first benchmark 
revenues were computed when Act 815 had not been passed and when oil 
production had not commenced. But this only means double standards as 
there was no need to allocate oil revenues for spending in the budget when 
oil production had not commenced. One wonders the legal basis for 
allocating oil revenues to the budget when the law was still pending in 
Parliament. Similarly, Tordo and Johnston, (2010) have argued  that  even if 
the arguments were valid, this would not have been the right time to 
determine benchmark revenues and ABFA as the Supplementary Budget has 
done. Tordo and Johnston (2010) further contend that  predictably, 
government allocated petroleum revenues to the original budget because the 
plan was to pass the law before the budget was presented to parliament, 
which did not materialize, therefore the logical time after this failure was to 
be 1st  September, 2011 for spending in the 2012 budget. And that this, 
however, could have also violated the law since there is provision in the law 
for the spending of oil revenues in 2011.  This study posits that there is 
purely a technical problem here but no one is to be blamed.   
 This study therefore supports the assertion that there is lack of public 
knowledge about the collateralization of the ABFA. The fact is that it 
remains unclear why the ABFA is being used to finance non-oil-
collateralized debts. Nakhle’s (2011) earlier study corroborated this position. 
To Nakhle (2011), in addition, the allocation for capacity building including 
oil and gas needs to be clarified because government has already signed a 
loan of $38 million with the World Bank for oil and gas capacity building, 
which the budget was very silent on. Furthermore, while oil and gas revenues 
management policy design elements are important, so are the means by 
which the revenues are allocated. Ghana’s work program bidding by which 
oil and gas extraction contracts  are awarded on the basis of competitive bids, 
has a major shortcoming of lack of transparency on what is judged to be 
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competitive.  This study posits that, in the end what should become a 
competitive bid, in fact, becomes a negotiated package on oil and gas 
quantity as well as the revenues obtained.   
 To this end, it is abundantly clear that Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil and 
gas sectors are bedeviled with a number of challenges including an oversight 
system or accountability mechanism to hold both government and oil 
partners in check. As a result scant information regarding revenues and its 
disbursement is made public and sadly, the media, the watchdog for the state 
and the stakeholders has very little access to information.  
 All in all, there is a theoretical gap regarding a proper oversight 
mechanism for ensuring accountability confirmed by this study.    This study 
is therefore original and valuable, because it fills the existing gap in research 
on Ghanaians’ knowledge, attitudes and growing perceptions over the lack of 
proper accountable mechanism for the management of the oil and gas 
revenues from the extractive industries in the Jubilee fields.   
 
Methodology 
 This study employed both quantitative and qualitative approaches.  It 
was also descriptive and undertook a content analysis of relevant literature.  
Where statistical and primary data were used they were a derivative of 
secondary sources. With reference to related literature and debates, the 
researcher made use of studies on political economy, to help in making the 
argument. Epistemologically, it employed the neopatrimonial thesis, oil-rich 
nations or oil wealth and resource curse theories to provide the 
understanding of the dynamics and travails of lack of accountability in 
Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil and gas extraction sectors. Particularly, the survey 
(questionnaire) and in-depth interviews (productive dialogue) approaches 
respectively were employed for primary data and peer reviewed articles, 
newspapers and magazines were also used as secondary sources. This study 
explored and analyzed whether or not the revenues from Ghana’s Jubilee 
Fields are advancing development of the entire Ghanaian economy or rather 
facing some disruptive potentialities that tends to threaten national security. 
A sample size of two hundred and fifty (250) respondents was selected from 
the Western and Central Regions of Ghana. The sample size consisted of two 
hundred (200) respondents for the survey and fifty (50) respondents for the 
face-to-face interviews.  Purposive sampling technique was used and the 
selection of study areas was informed by convenience, representativeness 
and proximity to the oil and gas fields.   
 In the discussion section this study solicited and analyzed the 
opinions of Ghanaians on the criticalities of the mismanagement of revenues 
at Ghana’s Jubilee Fields, whether or not patron-client networks serve as the 
disruptive potentialities to transparency in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields’ revenues 
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management and attempted at confirming whether or not the Jubilee Fields’ 
revenues are ensuring development for all Ghanaians or for a few of them.  
This study encountered a number of methodological challenges, which were 
classified as technical and critical. The technical challenge had to do with 
accessibility, language barriers, respondents’ unwillingness to participate and 
rescheduling of appointments.  The critical challenge had to do with the 
reliability and accuracy of the translations by the hired translators.  However, 
the researcher made sure that these challenges never compromised the 
findings of the study.   
 
 Findings and Discussions 
 This study revealed that the majority of the respondents were 
pessimistic about whether or not Ghana’s Jubilee Fields’ revenues would 
focus on national development or be a menace towards national security. The 
practical implication of the findings was demonstrated in the desire of an 
overwhelming majority of respondents, especially the civil society group to 
express freely their views about the management of the revenues.  
 
Background of Respondents 
 A sample of 250 Ghanaians was interviewed.  It was made up of 200 
respondents for the survey and 50 respondents were selected for the elite 
interview.  The sample of 200 respondents selected from academics, NGOs 
specialized in governance issues, the media and the masses. The sex 
distribution of the respondents was as follows. 57.5% of the respondents 
were male whereas female respondents constituted 40.5%.  Some 2.0% of 
the respondents failed to indicate their sex status. This means that the sex 
distribution was fairly balanced. There was also a regional balance as table 1 
indicates.   
Table 1 (What is your region of origin?) 
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative  Percent 
Valid 
Non- 
response 8 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Central 98 49.0 49.0 53.0 
Western 94 47.0 47.0 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
Source: Survey Questionnaire 
 
              Incidentally, the survey conducted in the Central Region 
understandably had a majority of 49.0% of the respondents. The age 
distribution was also somewhat balanced with respondents coming from all 
the age groups as table 2 below shows, even though majority of the 
respondents came from the 36-45 (29.0%) and 46-55 (26.5%) age groups, 
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however, only a few respondents 4.0% failed to mention a particular age 
group within which they belong.    
Table 2 (Age group you belong to) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative  
Percent 
Valid 
Non-response 9 1.5 4.0 4.0 
18-25 63 10.5 10.5 14.5 
26-35 159 26.5 26.5 41.0 
36-45 174 29.0 29.0 70.0 
46-55 69 11.5 11.5 81.5 
56-65 99 16.5 16.5 98.0 
66 and above 27 3.5 2.0 100.0 
Total 600 100.0 100.0  
Source: Survey Questionnaire  
 
                With regards to selected areas, 49.0% of the respondents were 
residents of Takoradi, Sekondi and Tarkwa.  Moreover, 47.0%, of the 
respondents were also residents of Cape Coast, Elmina and Salt pond, 
indeed, this indicating that all the two regions namely, Central and Western 
were duly covered in the survey.  
                With regard to the employment status, 71.0% of the respondents 
indicated they were employed, 28.0% of them stated they were unemployed 
whilst only a small minority of 1.0% did not respond to the question on their 
employment status.   
Table 3. (Employment Status) 
  Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Non-responses 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Employed 142 71.0 71.0 72.0 
Unemployed 56 28.0 28.0 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
 Source: Survey Questionnaire. 
 
              Regarding monthly incomes in Ghana Cedis, 36.0% of the 71.0% of 
the respondents with employable status indicated they earn a monthly 
income of about GH₵ 1,700. 00 and above. Meanwhile, 14.0% of the 
respondents indicated they earn about GH₵1, 500.00 to below GH₵1,700.00.  
8.0% of those employed earn about GH₵1, 300.00 to below GH₵1,500.00, 
while 4.0% earn about GH₵1, 100.00 to below GH₵1,300.00 per month.  
Moreover, 3.0% earn about GH₵900 to below GH₵1,100.00 per month and 
5.0% earn GH₵700.00 to below GH₵900.00 monthly.  Furthermore, about 
30.0% said they receive GH₵500.00 to below GH₵300.00 monthly.    
 
 
 
European Scientific Journal December 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.2   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
260 
Table 4. (Monthly Income Bracket) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative  
Percent 
Valid 
GH₵ 1,700. 00 and 
above 72 36.0 36.0 36.0 
GH₵1, 500.00 to 
below 
GH₵1,700.00 
28 14.0 14.0 50.0 
GH₵1, 300.00 to 
below 
GH₵1,500.00 
16 8.0 8.0 58.0 
GH₵1, 100.00 to 
below 
GH₵1,300.00 
8 4.0 4.0 62,0 
GH₵900 to below 
GH₵1,100.00 6 3.0 3.0 65.0 
GH₵700.00 to 
below GH₵900.00 10 5.0 5.0 70.0 
GH₵100.00 to 
below GH₵700.00 60 30.0 30.0 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
Source: Survey Questionnaire  
 
                 The respondents indicated that “there are growing perceptions of 
Ghanaians over the lack of proper accountable mechanism for the 
management of the sector and the revenues from the extractive industries in 
the Jubilee fields.”  Thus, the data analysis confirmed that an overwhelming 
majority of about 78.0% of the respondents were aware that oil and gas 
revenues were mismanaged because there is lack of proper accountability 
mechanism in the oil and gas extractive industries. A small minority of 
17.0% of the respondents did not think that the revenues were being 
mismanaged and 5.0% were ignorant about the oil and gas extractive 
industries.  The practical manifestation of the oil and gas mismanagement is 
revealed in table 4.4 below where 60.5% of the respondents stated that they 
often heard that oil and gas revenues are channeled towards political gains,  
whilst 36.0% said they  very often heard with only 1.0% who had never 
heard of how oil and gas revenues were managed.  
Table 5. (Mismanagement of Oil and Gas revenues) 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Never 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Often 121 60.5 60.5 61.5 
Very often 72 36.0 36.0 97.5 
Don’t know 5 2.5 2.5 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
 Source: Survey Questionnaire. 
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             The lack of an accountability mechanism resulting from crony 
capitalist’s activities and pervasive patronage politics negatively affects 
national development in various ways. As table 4.5 below shows, 32.5% of 
the respondents claimed that lack of an accountability mechanism coupled 
with pervasive patronage politics was likely to produce resource curse, 
whilst 27.5% said it slowed down development and about 5.5% of the 
respondents said they had no idea. 
                For a country that has joined the Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
group and is struggling to get out of economic underdevelopment, such a 
lack of an accountability mechanism coupled with widespread patron-
clientelist networks render the prospects of economic take-off not hopeful.  
Table 6 (C2 the implications of the lack of transparency and proper accountability 
mechanism) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Nonresponse 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
It slows down 
development 55 27.5 27.5 28.5 
Fuels partisan  
politics 11 5.5 5.5 34.0 
No idea 2 1.0 1.0 35.0 
Produce resource 
curse 65 32.5 32.5 67.5 
Increase 
corruption 65 32.5 32.5 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
Source: Survey Questionnaire. 
 
         To the question; ‘how would you rank the contribution of the oil and 
gas towards national development in Ghana?’, almost a third of the 
respondents (47.0%) graded the contribution as poor, whilst 7.5% ranked the 
contribution as very poor. Some 43.5% and 2.0% ranked the contribution as 
fairly good and very good respectively.   
Table 7. (Ranking of Contribution of the oil and gas towards National Development) 
  Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Poor 94 47.0 47.0 47.0 
Very Poor 15 7.5 7.5 54.5 
Fairly Good 121 43.5 36.0 98.0 
Good 4 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
 Source: Survey Questionnaire. 
 
             However, in spite of the generally poor contribution rendered, most 
respondents thought that the right transparency and accountability in oil and 
gas extractive industries in Ghana was crucial, compared to some 40.5% who 
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thought that partisan politics was widespread in the sector. When 
respondents said there was partisan politics in the oil and gas sector in 
Ghana, they meant different things. Whereas a greater amount of the 
revenues were used to support party members, it also meant that recruitment 
in the oil and gas extractive industries were conducted on a partisan basis.   
             While 52.5% of the respondents attributed the lack of transparency 
and proper accountability mechanism to governmental or political 
interference, 26.0%, 11.05%, and 9.5% ascribed the lack of proper 
accountability to ineffective law enforcement agency and patronage politics 
respectively.  The implication here is that any increases in general tariffs 
unaccompanied by political or governmental disengagement will only be a 
cosmetic solution. The interview conducted revealed that “there is a high 
measure of pessimism among the respondents as to whether a permanent 
solution to the mismanagement is possible in the foreseeable future.  
Findings from the interviews showed that many Ghanaians have given up 
any hope of a future solution to the oil and gas revenues contribution towards 
national development, and this is understandably so, for Ghanaians have had 
to live in poverty for a long time and it appears all previous attempts to solve 
the poverty problems have failed.  The findings revealed that some 36.0% of 
the respondents do not foresee any solution to the oil and gas challenge in the 
future, whilst 54.0% of the respondents are optimistic that a solution may be 
found in the future.  
              Among the possible solutions offered by the respondents were: civil 
society should back up and strengthen agitations and demand their fair share 
of the oil and gas revenue (23% of respondents), efficient management and 
more funds (23.5% of respondents), checking corruption (1.0% of 
respondents), checking partisan and patronage politics (9.0% of 
respondents), use oil and gas revenues profitably (2.0% of respondents), 
public education (2.0% of respondents), definitive oil and gas revenue policy 
(14.5% of respondents), publish what is produced  (1.0% of respondents) and 
then put in place proper checks and balances (15.5% of respondents). 
              Of all these, the single most important factor in solving the 
challenges in the oil and gas sectors, according to some 59.5% of the 
respondents, is efficient management. Some 20.0%, 9.0% and 9.0% think 
proper accountability mechanism, minimal state intervention, in that order, 
are critical to solving the oil and gas sector revenue management problems.  
Overall, in the opinion of an overwhelming majority of respondents (73.5%), 
the mismanagement was attributable to the lack of adequate oil and gas 
operating policy. This is an indictment of the state, since it is traditionally 
responsible for state policies including oil and gas revenue management 
policy. Table 4.7 throws further light on the correlation between state policy 
and the oil and gas revenues mismanagement.  
European Scientific Journal December 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.2   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
263 
Table 8 (E2 Governmental interference in oil and gas revenues policy in Ghana) 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Nonresponse 1 .5 .5 .5 
Yes 65 32.5 32.5 33.0 
No 132 66.0 66.0 99.0 
Don’t know 2 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 200 100.0 100.0  
Source: Survey Questionnaire. 
 
           Here we notice that 66.0% of the respondents think that the oil and 
gas revenues management policies pursued by governments in Ghana have 
not been insulated from political interference. In other words, statist control 
and political interference are contributory factors to the mismanagement of 
oil and gas revenues. One of the most striking findings of the survey was that 
in spite of the negative impact of political or governmental interference on 
oil and gas extractive sector, most respondents (53.0%) do not see 
depoliticization as a panacea to the mismanagement. Only 46.0% of the 
respondents think that checking corruption is a solution to the challenges. As 
a further solution to the oil and gas sector predicament, most Ghanaians 
(about 55.5% of the respondents) think that Ghana should discontinue with 
the total sale of ownership of asset to her foreign development partners. Only 
44.05 of the respondents favour a continuation of the engagement trade 
between Ghana and her development partners. Finally, findings concerning 
the provision of broad energy laws and policies to protect Ghanaians were as 
follow; 26.5% suggested  the setting up of independent body that deals with 
energy,  11.05% proposed a policy to depoliticize the oil and gas sector, 
16.00% recommended the need to  provide transparent and proper 
accountability mechanism, 7.5% recommended the need for the foreigners to 
pay economic rates to Ghana, 5.5% recommended the need for efficient 
management, 11.4% the need to  ensure equity and finally, 14.0 
recommended  publish all that is produced.    
           Generally, the majority of Ghanaians have demonstrated 
overwhelmingly through their negative expressions, their disappointment in 
the lack of an accountability mechanism. As the media reportage, 
government’s report as well as the reports by oil and gas dealers to 
Ghanaians have shown, there is no clarity about the exact quantity of oils and 
gas and total revenues (Johnston, 2007). The originality and value of this 
study reflects the fact that it contributes to filling the existing gap in research 
on Ghanaians’ knowledge, attitudes and growing perceptions about the lack 
of accountability mechanism coupled with pervasive cronyism (whom you 
know or who knows you) and nepotism (favouritism) regarding the 
management of the Jubilee Fields oil and gas revenues.   
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Accountability Mechanism in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields Oil and Gas 
Sectors 
            In diagnosing the level of accountability in Ghana’s Jubilee oil and 
gas sectors for the period 2010 to now, the study concerned itself with 
exploring whether or not the oil and gas sectors could bring about national 
development or result in the ‘resource curse.’ This was against the backdrop 
that accountability in the sector gives the impression of a façade and hence 
this could be a menace in disguise.   
           To attribute the challenges such as lack of a proper accountability 
mechanism in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil and gas sectors to a particular factor 
is rather perilous for the reason that it cannot be done with a high degree of 
exactitude. Notwithstanding the evidence or facts at hand, there will be a 
certain degree of error in the prognosis.  It must be pointed out, however, 
that the conclusions arrived at in this study are based on hard data and should 
be useful to journalists, students, stakeholders, policy-makers and the civil 
society group in Ghana as a whole.   
           Meanwhile, the primary objective of the survey, as in any scientific 
research, was to gather data that would enable us to verify our basic 
assumption. Here, this study discusses the findings to see whether the 
findings support or oppose the basic argument. A glance at the data analysis 
provides some useful insights into the accountability mechanism in the oil 
and gas extractive industries.  It demonstrates a lack of an accountability 
mechanism coupled with widespread patronage politics, its impact and the 
general perceptions of policy-makers and ordinary people as to how revenues 
from oil and gas sectors are to be put to use or managed.  To restate the basic 
assumption: The revenues obtained from the oil and gas extractive industries 
would tend to be a blessing or a curse depending upon the manner in which 
the revenues would be put to use or managed.  
           As already indicated, the findings revealed that majority of the 
respondents were pessimistic about the likelihood of the Jubilee Fields 
revenues being a guarantee to equity in national development.  Or on the 
other hand probably a menace to  national security.  
            The practical implication of the findings is demonstrated in the desire 
of an overwhelming majority of respondents, especially the civil society 
group to express freely their views about the management of the oil and gas 
revenues. This study is thus, original and valuable, because it fills the 
existing gap in research on people’s growing perceptions over the lack of an 
accountability mechanism coupled with pervasive patronage politics for the 
management of the Jubilee Fields’ oil and gas sectors.   
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Conclusion  
            This study is by no means exhaustive. It provides partial answers and 
lays the groundwork for further inquiry. It draws attention to institutional 
design challenges, the ways and means by which Ghana could ensure 
accountability in oil and gas sectors, and the implications of the institutional 
design for better performance of the industry, to enhance transparency as 
well as to ensure the maximization of the benefits to the citizenry. It makes 
some significant contributions to the existing literature on oil and gas 
extraction in Ghana.  
               This study established that natural resource endowment has value to 
which the owner has a claim. When the owner is not the resource developer 
or producer, fiscal instruments are used to capture that value. This study 
reviewed Ghana’s oil and gas accountability mechanism as of the year 2010 
and compared the key features of the regime with that of a peer group of oil-
producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and assessed the regime against 
five key features of importance to government and prospective investors: 
The degree of progressivity, stability, flexibility, neutrality and how the 
regime distributes the burden of risk between the resource owner and 
contractors.  
             Clearly, Ghana’s Supplementary Budget exposed the obsession for 
spending by Governments of resource producing countries. They do not 
know ‘breaks’ even if it means violating the legal frameworks or interpreting 
them to suit their interests. The transparency demonstrated in the budget is 
commendable because it has brought to the fore the potential to abuse the oil 
and gas sectors’ accountability and has therefore laid the foundation for 
public scrutiny in the management of expected large inflows of capital from 
oil and gas exploitation as Ghana becomes a major oil producer in the near 
future.  
 Ghanaians and development partners have the right to question the 
government on matters regarding mismanagement and misapplication of the 
country’s oil wealth which is known to be  non-renewable. By this way it 
could bring about public accountability and sustainable development. 
Ghanaians are still wondering how to prevent or break the “curse” that has 
often marked Africa’s oil and mining industries.  This study has elucidated 
examples of oil and gas problems that are very close to home for instance, 
such as that which is found in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries.  It 
also provides information about the continent’s largest crude producer and 
reveals how successive governments have depleted the earnings from crude 
oil sales since the 1970s. Besides, Ghana’s own record in managing mineral 
revenues after a hundred years of gold mining was highlighted. 
             This study has also attempted at explaining the seemingly new dawn 
which has broken and to offer civil society the platform on oil and gas as 
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well as the coalition of civil society groups that promote transparent and 
accountable management of oil and mineral wealth to air their views on 
Africa Renewal including Ghana’s attempt to create a right path and a law 
that governs how the oil revenue should be collected and managed. In view 
of the need for dealing with critical issues of accountability, crony capitalism 
and nepotism therefore, this study explored the challenges encountered by 
the sector in ensuring a proper accountability mechanism and also to 
minimize cronyism and nepotism bedeviling the Jubilee Fields.   
 This study posits that through media reportage and other stakeholder 
watchdog activities, the transparency and issues of crony capitalism and 
nepotism characterizing the management of Jubilee Fields’ oil and gas 
revenues could not only be brought to public attention but also be minimized 
to promote national development as opposed to the perceived ‘resource 
curse’. In addition, this study unearthed the background to  oil and gas 
discovery in Ghana, investigated the accountability mechanism and 
patronage politics in the oil and gas extractive industries and finally, 
analyzed the development prospects for Ghanaians by focusing mainly on 
the construction and maintenance of an effective accountability mechanism 
in the oil and gas sectors.  
 The expectation has been that patronage politics and crony capitalism 
which has since the commencement of oil and gas  extraction been obscuring 
accountability in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil be well- investigated and 
media’s sensitization of public on matters of Jubilee Fields’ oil and gas 
sectors will be promoted. Also to bring into the limelight such a policy 
regarding revenue re-distribution intended to accelerate national 
development.  It also sought to elucidate how the lack of accountability in oil 
and gas sectors could serve as a menace to national security in Ghana.   
 Finally, oil and gas constitute a national asset and that the oil and gas 
proceeds obtained from the extractive industries and the use and 
management of oil and gas revenues must be guided by law  to provide 
development for the entire citizenry.  
 
Recommendations 
 This study makes a number of recommendations based on the 
conclusions. On the theoretical level, judging from the kind of data collected, 
it would be of interest to a prospective researcher to delve more into why 
transparency and a proper accountability mechanism are becoming a more 
dominant issue or phenomenon in the oil and gas sectors.  
 There is a world of choice open to the design of oil and gas revenues 
management regime, and hence the media should be well-equipped to be 
able to access information regarding accountability to hold government and 
oil and gas partners in check.  
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 Policy makers should note that one step towards reversing the 
paradox labeled ‘resource curse’ lies in the effective management of oil and 
gas revenues, ensure adequate information flow and provision of training for 
media activists in order to provide an informed analysis on the sector in their 
reportage.  There should be a synergy between government, the private 
sector and the media to ensure that the activities that will help attract 
investments in to the country are publicized.  
 Parliament should expedite action to pass the Right to Information 
Bill to empower the media in particular and Ghanaians in general to have 
access to information pertaining to oil and gas production and revenues. 
Policy makers should adopt the US Dodd-Frank Act, i.e. Publish What You 
Pay law and apply it to the later. 
 In the light of the aforementioned issues, it is recommended that the 
synergy between the oil and gas industry and the rest of the economy 
becomes important to ensure that Ghana achieves a broad-based 
development and that the exploration of its natural resources meets the needs 
and aspirations of its citizens. Furthermore, it is recommended that Revenue 
Transparency should collaborate with Transparency International (TI) and 
the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) in making oil and gas revenues more 
beneficial to the society by ensuring information flow to the public domain.  
It is also, recommended that decisions over the type of fiscal regime, the 
state’s needs for revenue for the extraction of its resources, the incentives 
system, the monitoring and cost verifications, and equitable risk-sharing 
become important considerations within the context of the geological 
uncertainties in oil and gas extractive industries. 
 Since the current oil and gas extraction regime does not provide for 
standardization of the terms governing oil and gas contracts, it is 
recommended that the Petroleum Income Tax Law (PNDCL 188) 
promulgated in 1987 which  contains some fundamental flaws should be 
fully reviewed.  Such revision should reflect current industry best practices 
with the view to guard against open ended exemptions, allowances, and 
withholding taxes, transfer pricing and cost containment.  
 However, a superficial revision that does not respond adequately to 
the concerns but betrays the trust of citizens in the state’s capacity to realize 
the full benefit of resource extraction for the public interests should be 
discouraged. A better option might be to repeal the Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee (PIAC) and incorporate all its essential features 
into the Internal Revenue Act  (IRA) to ensure consistency of the treatment 
of chargeable income and with greater clarity on “cost stop” elements for all 
extractive industries.  
 Finally, there should be institutional incentives to check or minimize 
widespread patron-client networks and to insulate the oil and gas sectors 
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from the vagaries of patronage politics and crony capitalism. Widespread 
crony capitalism and pervasive patron-client politics which reinforces the 
paradox labeled the ‘resource curse’ would however be reversed provided 
successive governments construct and maintain a credible and effective 
accountability mechanism in Ghana’s Jubilee Fields oil and gas sectors 
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